Another way to put into practice a subtle differentiation in terms of adaptation is to recognise the importance of international support and cooperation in adaptation efforts to Article 7(6) of the Paris Agreement. This will be discussed in the next section. We are limiting the release date to 2016 and more. Since the PA was finalised in December 2015, this ensures that the documents identified are relevant to the PA and not to previous climate agreements. We continue to exclude REDD+. This mechanism was in place long before the PA negotiations. Thus, we found that most studies on REDD+ focused on projects that excluded PA and were not relevant to our analysis of PA effectiveness. Finally, we are aware that limiting ourselves to the Web of Science and Scopus platforms limits the completeness of our research by excluding grey literature. Our findings on existing research gaps should therefore be put into perspective by limiting ourselves to peer-reviewed research2 for this study.

Nevertheless, we affirm that the discovery of a gap in the peer-reviewed literature remains an important and valid finding. Sachs, who generally believes in international agreements, sees this as a bad thing, with immeasurable environmental consequences. But he fears that people won`t take these more pessimistic opportunities seriously. So let`s take a cold and hard look at the state of Paris with this document in hand. We`re going to start with a little bit of context, for context. Every five years, countries should assess their progress in implementing the agreement through a process known as the global stocktaking; The first is scheduled for 2023. Countries set their own targets, and there are no enforcement mechanisms in place to ensure they achieve those targets. The result is a Paris agreement filled with the sound and anger of good intentions, but not much else. It is comforting, for example, that Paris has approved the new temperature target of 1.5°C. But what is not in the agreement is an indication of how this could be achieved. What is in the agreement suggests that this will not be the case. Another example of recurring categories is differentiation, which refers to the prudent differentiation of responsibilities within the PA, which goes beyond „common but differentiated responsibilities“ and includes „respective capabilities“ and „national realities“ (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 2015a).

However, this remains controversial, as ongoing conflicts over this differentiation of responsibilities remain a frequently cited obstacle and two articles suggest ways to overcome these conflicts. „Experiment/Learn“ is another factor mentioned. He refers to the PA as a political experiment in which member states and non-state actors report on each other`s political experiences and learn from them. Conversely, the lack of opportunities for actors under the PA regime to receive feedback and learn from each other is called the „feedback/learning“ barrier. The recommendation on communication and learning includes suggestions on how communication processes can be better structured within the PA to enable better learning between actors. Institutional associations of asset owners and think tanks also noted that the stated goals of the Paris Agreement are implicitly „based on the assumption – that UN member states, including high-level polluters such as China, the United States, India, Russia, Japan, Germany, South Korea, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Canada, Indonesia and Mexico, which cause more than half of the world`s greenhouse gas emissions, will somehow reduce their carbon pollution. reduce voluntarily and persistently, without a binding enforcement mechanism to measure and control CO2 emissions at all levels, from factory to state, and without a specific penalty rating or tax burden (e.g. a carbon tax) to prevent bad behaviour.

[99] However, emissions taxes (such as a carbon tax) can be integrated into the country`s NDC. To assess whether self-dependence is compatible with subtle differentiation, we have distinguished three categories of countries: developed countries listed in Annex I of the UNFCCC; LDCs and SIDS (in line with the subtle differentiation of the Paris Agreement) and the rest of the countries (which we call „emerging markets“). We analysed whether these categories of countries show discernible cascading results compared to the subtle differentiation identified in the Paris Agreement (see Table 1). Hypothetically, for example, if 70 per cent of LDCs and SIDS included a particular topic in their NDCs, compared to only 40 per cent of emerging markets and only 10 per cent of Annex I countries, such a cascade would demonstrate a self-differentiation of NDCs from that issue. On the other hand, if similar percentages of emerging markets and LDCs and SIDS contain a particular topic, no cascade is demonstrated, meaning that self-reference would continue to be dichotomous. The procedure is described in more detail in the additional information online. „This agreement will disappoint many observers who were hoping for a gradual change in global ambitions [on climate change]. However, it`s no surprise that the reality is far from meeting those expectations,“ Chatterton concluded. If Trump is re-elected, the treaty is likely doomed to failure.

The rest of the world simply will not increase its ambitions or bear the costs while the United States pursues a path of climate universalism. But even if it is not, the lack of U.S. climate leadership, which is now a permanent condition, will deprive the agreements of one of their central drivers. As grim as these warnings are, it`s important not to get too tangled up when you think about the specific shortcomings of the Paris Agreement or what another form of international agreement would have done better. The fact is that any international agreement (especially a voluntary agreement like Paris) is a reflection of aggregated national will rather than a driver of it. An international treaty can capture and formalize what nations are willing to do and facilitate their coordination, but it cannot generate national political will where there is none. Following the conclusion of COP 21 (21st session of the Conference of the Parties presiding over the Conference) on 12 September. In December 2015, the final text of the Paris Agreement was agreed by all 195 Member States participating in the UNFCCC and the European Union[4] to reduce emissions as part of the greenhouse gas reduction methodology. In the 12-page agreement,[54] members pledged to reduce their carbon emissions „as quickly as possible“ and to do their best to keep global warming „well below 2°C“ [3.6°F]. [63] Poker chips reduce emissions. .